DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director **FROM:** Tom Spatz, Pantex Site Representative

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending January 25, 2013

Board Staff Activities: This week, R. Arnold and J. Mercier were at the Pantex Plant to take the Nuclear Explosive Training course *Facility Safety Systems Course* (Course # NSTE-276).

In-Service Inspection (ISI) Requirement: This week, the NNSA Production Office (NPO) approved an Authorization Basis (AB) change proposal related to high explosive (HE) drops onto tooling during HE packaging. B&W Pantex Authorization Basis credits HE floor mats with mitigating the consequence from HE drops in the weapon Hazard Analysis Report (HAR). The HAR contains an ISI requirement for the HE floor mats that states "noticeable dirt or pebbles that can be felt on the surface shall be removed." The HAR also states that the frequency of performing this ISI is "prior to use". The Site Representative attempted to independently verify that this ISI is implemented by the Production Technicians (PTs). The Site Representative observed that this ISI is found as a visual inspection in the pre-operation checks performed by the PTs. The Site Representative discussed the safety concern with NPO that this ISI is not actually performed prior to use and may not be effective at removing particles that may not be seen, yet can be felt on the surface. NPO has taken action to look into the situation.

Human Factors: In December 2012, B&W Pantex proposed submitting a plan to implement Chapter 13, *Human Factors*, of the Sitewide Safety Analysis Report (SAR) by the end of June 2013. (See report for 12/21/12.) The Sitewide SAR states that Chapter 13 has been included for completeness of the document but that it has not been implemented. In August 2012 NPO returned without approval the last attempt to revise Chapter 13 (See report for 8/24/12.) This week, NPO issued a letter directing B&W Pantex to provide NPO with an implementation plan to fully implement Chapter 13, of the Sitewide SAR by February 7, 2013.

Wet Pipe Fire Suppression System: This week, NPO issued a letter directing B&W Pantex to correct a nuclear safety deficiency related to a surveillance requirement (SR) of a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR). NPO identified that the SR for the wet pipe fire suppression system does not completely validate the operability of the safety class system. One of the operability criteria of the system is "an unobstructed and intact water delivery system from the facility to the sprinkler head." NPO discovered that the associated SR tests delivery from the post indicating valve to the wet pipe valve, but not all the way to the sprinkler head. B&W Pantex does perform the entire delivery system check as a maintenance activity to satisfy National Fire Protection Association requirements, but not as a SR for the TSR. NPO directed B&W Pantex to correct the SR to ensure that the operability criteria are met, perform an extent of condition, and brief NPO on actions to be taken in response to their letter.

Sitewide SAR Annual Update: This week, NPO returned the safety basis change proposal AB-12-27, *Sitewide SAR 2012 Annual Update*, to B&W Pantex without approval. NPO did not approve the annual update because it incorporated a description of a facility modification that is not consisted with the actual facility condition. NPO directed B&W Pantex to evaluate the internal review process for safety basis changes to determine how an incorrect facility description was incorporated into the annual update.